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COMMENTS

These few cases represent substantially all of the law on future advances on mortgages in Washington. True, there are not many cases,
but the few that are on the record display a consistent handling of the
problem in line with what seems to be the majority holding on all
phases of the problem. The only question which is as yet unsettled
in this jurisdiction is the one the court refused to answer in the Elmendorj case. The question is, "What effect will the recording of a junior
encumbrance have upon the rights of the mortgagee who advances
funds at his option subsequent to the recording of the junior encumbrance, but without a c t u a I knowledge of the subsequent encumbrance?" This question was passed over in the Elmendorf case because, knowledge being admitted, the court did not have to answer it.
But when the occasion does arise, it is the writer's guess that the Washington court will follow the majority, as it has in all the other phases
of the problem of future advances, and declare that unless the mortgagee making the voluntary advances has actual notice of the subsequent lien, he will be protected as to those voluntary advances.
JOHN

B.

KRHIcii.

RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR PRIVATE NUISANCE
With a reversal of position amounting almost to defiance of precedent, the majority opinion in Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc.1
denies damages for injury caused to respondent's premises by dust from
appellant's plant at Concrete, Washington. The plant, in operation
since 1908, is the main industry of the town, at least half of its residents being economically dependent upon the plant. Respondent, who
had resided in Concrete since 1907, in 1934 purchased a home within
three blocks of the cement plant, and lived therein until August 1938,
when he left Concrete. The home, partially furnished, has been rented
since 1938.
The respondent brought suit in which he asked for an injunction
against the plant and damages for injury to the property and for personal discomfort caused by the dust blown from the appellant's kilns.
Injunctive relief was properly 2 denied by trial court, which, however,
awarded five hundred dollars for damages sustained. On appeal, the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld that part of the decision denying
the injunction, but it denied 3 recovery for damages, as indicated above,
and reversed the trial court's decision to that extent.
Essentially, the problem, as viewed by the majority, is whether or
not an individual buying property in an industrial community can col2 115 Wash. Dec. 12, 129 P. (2d) 536 (1942).
2
Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306, 37
A. L. R. 683 (1924); Mattson v. Defiance Lumber Co., 154 Wash. 503, 282
Pac. 848 (1929); see note, 5 WAsF. L. REv. 76.
-'There is one dissenting opinion and thr e e judges concurred in
two concurring opinions.
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lect damages for interference with the ordinary and reasonable enjoyment of his home caused by dust which is unavoidably created in the
manufacturing process. The majority takes the position that the dust
did not cause material damage to the property but considered it to be
merely annoying and unpleasant. As a matter of fact, there was some
dispute as to the extent and character of the injury sustained, the trial
court finding that the air-borne substance "decreased the life of the
paint. It damages the roof and shortens the life of the roof." This item
would clearly seem to warrant a finding of material injury to the
property, but the language of the majority indicates that they did not
find such injury resulting from the dust deposited on the respondent's
property. It may be that the emphasis on the evidence introduced to
show that the dust discolored the shrubbery, interferred with the washing and drying of clothes and generally increased the burden of housekeeping led the court to consider that type of injury rather than material injury. No showing of negligence was made; in fact it was
shown that the cement company had installed the best equipment and
had eliminated the nuisance as much as possible. This being so, it is to
be concluded that the dust is an inescapable burden giving rise to the
problem as to whether the nuisance-creating industry or the private
home owner must bear the cost.
Though the cases awarding damages for actual destruction are not
definitive under the facts of the main case, they represent the only type
of factual situation which reached the Supreme Court for many years,
and, hence, are worthy of mention here. One of the earliest cases on
the question of recovery against an industry for a nuisance was Sterrett
v. Northport Mining and Smelting Company,4 in which damages were
awarded for destruction of plaintiff's property by sulphur fumes created
in the smelting process. The policy formulated in that case and which
has been invoked in most of the subsequent cases was stated as follows:
". .. The smelter is not operated in any manner different
from that in which smelters are usually operated. The business carried on in a lawful business. The fumes are poisonous
and destructive. No way to overcome the difficulties has ever
been found.
cc* *It is lawful to operate a smelter. No one has a right,
however, to pursue a lawful business if thereby he injures his
neighbor, without compensating such for the damages actually
sustained." (Italics added.)
The rule allowing recovery against an industry was extended somewhat in Park v. Northport Smelting and Refining Company.5 There
was no dispute that plaintiff's trees had been destroyed by fumes from
the defendant's plant, but conflicting testimony was introduced in regard to the amount of damage sustained. The court ruled that the difficulty of proving damages was no defense to such an action and inferred
that if substantial damages could not be proved, nominal damages, at
least, were recoverable. The plaintiff again recovered in Johnson v.
Northport Smelting and Refining Company' which action was for damages alleged to have been caused to timber on the plaintiff's property
by gases discharged from the smelter.
130 Wash. 164, 70 Pac. 266 (1902).

47 Wash. 497, 92 Pac. 442 (1907).
(150 Wash. 567, 97 Pac. 746 (1908).
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In Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Company,7 which belongs
to the group of cases in which relief is granted for material damage, the
cement company was held liable on the authority of the Sterrett rule.
The majority opinion in the Powell case refers to the Hardin decision
acknowledging the theory of the earlier case to be "that no one has a
right to pursue a lawful business, if thereby he injures his neighbor,
without compensating that neighbor for the damages actually sustained." Then, instead of attempting to differentiate the cases on the
question of material and substantial damage sustained, which could
easily have been done,8 the Hardin holding is effectively excluded from
further consideration by the statement that "the presence or absence
of precedent should not determine the question in the case at bar."
In 1924, the court decided Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Company,9
and in that case there is language to bridge the gap between the clearcut cases of material d a m a g e and the case in which only
discomfort and annoyance are alleged, to which type the Powell case
belongs. As in the main case, the property damage in Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Company was purchased after the industrial plant had
been in operation for many years and the purchaser was thereby
charged with knowledge of the soot, cinders and other substances
which would be deposited on his property. The opinion in that case
reviewed all of the Washington decisions in point and then expressed
the rule which has been in effect in this state until the Powell decision.
"The rule governing in the foregoing and many other cases
is not that one may use his own property as he sees fit, so
long as he uses it in the usual manner and without negligence,
but that one may put his own property to any use he sees fit,
so long as he does not thereby materially damage someone
else or his property and that negligence is not the sole test of
responsibility. Where a trade or business is carried on in such
manner as to materially interfere with the reasonable and
comfortable enjoyment by another of his property, or which
occasions material injury to the property itself, a wrong is
done for which an action for damages will lie, without regard
to the locality where such business is carried on, and notwithstanding the business be entirely lawful, and notwithstanding
the best and most approved appliances and methods may be
used in the construction and management of the business."
(Italics added.)
There was an attempt on the part of the appellant to impeach this
rule by showing that the point of "comfortable enjoyment" was not
an issue in the Bartel case. Since actual damages had been sustained,
the appellant argued, the facts do not support the rule. However, Judge
Bridges, in stating the rule, merely purported to summarize and restate the rule governing cases previously decided 0 not only in this
789 Wash. 320, 154 Pac. 450 (1913).
1In the process of manufacturing the cement, gas fumes and particles
of cement were thrown over upon Judge Hardin's premises, destroying
vegetation and greatly depreciating the property. No such material damage is present in the Powell case.
9
Supra note 2 .
10 The cases cited by Judge Bridges and referred to in the above quoted
part of the opinion include cases from the United States Supreme Court,
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jurisdiction but in many others. It was based upon a careful analysis
of leading cases and was employed as a rule for deciding the Bartel
case, but it was not meant to be the law of that case. Moreover, appellant's argument, however valid it might be with respect to the
Bartel holding, is negatived by Mattson v. Defiance Lumber Company11 in which the court, confronted squarely with the problem of
interference with reasonable enjoyment, applies the rule from the
Bartel case in granting relief.
A careful reading of the Mattson case, which is perhaps the best
known Washington case in point, serves to indicate that it is indistinguishable on its facts from the Powell case. Dr. Mattson bought
property on a bluff overlooking a sawmill and built a beautiful home
thereon. After establishing his residence there, he complained of "the
smoke nuisance" resulting from operation of the sawmill, and he alleged that the cinders, ashes and other matter deposited upon his
property substantially damaged it, and rendered the home of the plaintiffs less inviting and less comfortable and destroyed the enjoyment
thereof. After hearing the evidence the jury found that the Mattson property had not been substantially damaged, but it did find that
the plaintiff had been "deprived of the comfortable use and enjoyment of their premises." Relief was granted for this invasion of the
plaintiff's property rights. On appeal, the question of material damage
and depreciation was introduced, but the court did not base its award
of damages to the Mattsons on the finding of physical destruction. Apparently the court held it was not necessary to resolve the conflicting
testimony; instead it asserted that the law of the case was stated in
Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Company and quoted long portions of
that opinion including the paragraph set out above. This indicates
fairly conclusively that the Mattson opinion granted damages solely
on the basis of discomfort resulting from the nuisance. The exclusion,
in the holding, of consideration of substantial damage brings the Mattson case squarely in line, factually, with the Powell situation as delineated by the majority. Thus, the only two cases in Washington in
which recovery is not predicated in whole or in part upon the finding
of substantial destruction of property are diametrically opposed to each
other in their holdings.
Mention must be made of the statutory policy before the Washington treatment of this problem has been brought up to date. The
statutes, under the chapter dealing with those who may sue for damages
because of a nuisance, declares "such action may be brought by any
person whose property is injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance. 1 2 (Italics added.) This section has
never been applied to a set of facts quite analogous to those under
examination. Wherever it has been relied upon, however, the alternative aspects have been given equal emphasis. 3 Unless a strained conMinnesota, California, Massachusetts, as well as the Washington decisions
in point decided before 1924.
1Supra note 2.
12

RE1. REv.

STAT.

§ 944.

Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 298 (1921); Hall v. Galloway, 76 Wash. 42, 35 Pac. 478 (1913); Ingalls v. Eastman, 61 Wash. 289,
112 Pac. 372 (1910). This list is not exhaustive of the cases citing the statute but these cases are the ones most pertinent to the present inquiry.
13
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struction is given the statute, the conclusion cannot be escaped that
lessening of enjoyment caused by reason of the nuisance is a ground
for awarding damages. The opinion does not mention the statute.
Perhaps this is due to the fact that the appellant's use of this section
was only in connection with a point not discussed by the majority,
while the respondent did not expound its applicability to the case at
hand but was content merely to make reference to the section.
The present examination of Washington authority reveals that there
has been in the past no deviation' 4 from the policy of recognizing
the right of each individual to freedom from personal discomfort and
annoyance in maintaining his home. Furthermore, there is much support 5 for this proposition to be found in other jurisdictions.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baltimore and
Potomac Railway Company v. Fifth Baptist Church'6 presents a discussion of the principle allowing recovery for discomfort and interference with enjoyment of property unaccompanied by depreciation
in the market value or the rental value of the premises. Soot, smoke,
etc., from the railroad engines caused great discomfort to the congregation. In approving an instruction given by the trial court to be considered in making the award, the Supreme Court stated:
"The plaintiff was entitled to recover because of the inconvenience and discomfort caused to the congregation assembled,
thus necessarily tending to destroy the use of the building for
the purpose for which it was erected and dedicated. The property mighb not be depreciated in its salable or market value
• . . But, as the court below very properly said to the jury, the
congregation had the same right to the comfortable use of its
house for church purposes that a private gentleman has to the
comfortable enjoyment of his own house, and it is the discomfort and annoyance in its use for those purposes which is the
primary considerationin allowing damages. As with a blow on
the face, there may be no arithmetical rule for the estimate
of damage. There is, however, an injury, the extent of which
the jury may measure." (Italics added.)
A discussion of the problem by Virginia's court is found in the case
Virginia Ry. Co. v. London 7 which was an action for damages for
noise issuing from a roundhouse adjacent to plaintiff's property and
for the discomfort caused by smoke, soot and cinders spread on the
complainant's property by the locomotives occupying the roundhouse.
The opinion expresses approval of the Baltimore and Potomac Railway
Company position and, in addition, contains the following rationale
for granting recovery:
"IThe group of cases predicated upon mental rather than physical discomfort reflects the same policy: Champa v. Washington Compressed Gas
Co., 146 Wash. 190, 226 Pac. 228 (1927); Ferry v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 648,
200 Pac. 336, 203 Pac. 40 (1921); Goodrich v. Starett, 108 Wash. 437, 184
Pac. 220 (1919); but see, Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum Assoc., 103 Wash. 429,
174 5Pac. 961, 1 A. L. R. 541 (1918).
1 The textbooks are in line with the cases cited: COOLEY, TORTS (4th ed.
1932) III, § 432; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 186; PROSSE, TORTS (1941) § 74;
WALsg, EQurry (1930) § 56.
10 2 Sup. Ct. 719, 108 U. S. 317, 27 L. ED. 739 (1883).
17 114 Va. 334, 76 S. E. 306 (1912).
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"There can be no doubt, under the facts of this case, that
the value of the house of the defendant in error was, for residential purposes, greatly impaired by the nuisance created
by the plaintiff in error. That is a conceded wrong, and to
deny her the right to recover damages on account of that
wrong, because the market value of her property had been increased by the wrong, would be to say that she could be improved out of her home against her will by the wrongful act
of the plaintiff in error, and the law would afford her no redress."
Awarding $750.00 for discomfort and annoyance from the gas works,
the California court, in the case of Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban
Gas Company'8 took a stand directly contrary to the Powell ruling.
The opinion reads:
it... In order that a judgment of this character may be
upheld, it is not necessary that the health of plaintiff or of
members of his household should have been impaired. It is
sufficient if the odors, sounds, and smoke were offensive to the
senses.
"The fact that respondent proved no damage to the dwelling house or herbage on his land nor to the rental, or vendible
value of the property does not prevent the court from awarding damages. In the very nature of things the amount of detriment sustained is not susceptible of exact pecuniary computation. It is for the court to say what sum of money the plaintiff should receive in view of the discomfort or annoyance to
which he has been subjected."
One reading the Powell opinion in light of the preceding discussion
is not impressed with its soundness. If it is given full weight, the injured property owner has small hope of obtaining relief in this jurisdiction. Ostensibly, the conflict has been resolved in favor of the more
recent decision as it contains language expressly overruling cases to the
contrary. "Any opinion of this court which holds, or from which it
may be inferred, that one who voluntarily purchases property in a
manufacturing community may be compensated because of smoke,
gases, dust, or noises, inseparable from industrial activity in that community and reasonably necessary or expectable in the conduct of lawful industrial operations therein, is hereby overruled." Taken at its
face value, this language would apparently preclude recovery by anyone
purchasing property in an industrial area unless there is negligence
shown in operating the plant causing the nuisance. Or, realizing the
rigor of the Powell decision but wishing to uphold it withal, the court
could regard the language as exclusive and hence allow recovery to
one who purchased property before the nuisance-creating industry
entered the vicinity. Taking the statement literally, the unrestricted
language of the court permits of no relief, even when substantial and
material injury has been done.
To sustain its position in the face of the numerous decisions to the
contrary, the court cites only one case, Ebur v. Alloy Metal Wire
Is 157 Cal. 168, 106 Pac. 581 (1910).
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Company.19 The rule of the Ebur case, that one living in an industrial district must put up with the accompanying discomfort, is incorporated verbatim in Judge Millard's opinion. One thing, however,
which the court did not consider in adopting the statement from the
Ebur case was the fact that the language of the Pennsylvania court
was directed toward modifying the injunction granted by the trial
court and it was not an exposition of the rule to apply in awarding
damages. No one takes issue with the fact that it is possible to deny
an injunction and yet grant damages in the same instance.20 Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that damages would have been denied in the Ebur case even though the injunction was. Thus, the only
case cited by the majority is not directly in point.
Undeniably, one's sympathies are with the Portland Cement Company. Powell had lived in Concrete since 1907; he purchased the property in question in 1934; suit was not initiated until he had left the
property himself and rented it, with no loss in rental value being
shown. The cement company commenced its operations in Concrete
in 1908; it was the only industry of the town and most of the residents
were directly dependent upon it while all, including the respondent,
benefited from-it. However, with the weight of authority to the contrary, this would seem to be another example of "hard cases make
bad law."'
The 6ourt attempts to justify the holding on the theory that a contrary result would encourage litigation which would "harass industry
and likely bankrupt many industries of this state which it is the policy
of the law to protect within reason." Consistently, the Washington
court has attempted to secure the greatest good for the greatest number through the protection of industry and to that end adopted the
balancing of equities rule, although only a minority 22 of the jurisdictions go even that far. In both the Bartel and the Mattson opinions
the court expressly recognized that the public interestmustbeprotected,
and referring to the lumber industry of Washington, stated that "industries such as this must be permitted to exist." Yet, even while acknowledging that the leading industries of the state must be fostered
because public welfare depends on them, the court ruled that those
engaged in the lumber industry must pay for the damage that is unavoidably done to property in the proximity of sawmills. If the court
granted damages under such circumstances, it is difficult to understand
why the cause of industry is championed so strongly in a case involving a cement plant, cement obviously not being a leading Washing10 304 Pa. 177, 155 Atl. 280 (1931). Action to enjoin operation of defendant's plant, which manufactured metal products, because of smoke,
odors,
2 0 gases and noises.
PsossER, supra note 15, § 74.
21 Cases in which the industry is on a much larger scale than was the
defendant industry in the Powell case allow recovery even though the
plaintiff's property is of little value: Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co.,
167 Fed. 342 (1909) in which the court suggested that plaintiff was not
precluded from action for damages; McCarthy v. Bunker Hill Mining
Co., 164 Fed. 927 (1908); Madison v. Ducktown etc. Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83
S. W. 658 (1904) granted damages although the property injured was less
than $1,000 in value as compared with the industry valued at over $2,000,000
and supporting over 10,000 people.
22.
See note, 5 WAsH. L. REv. 76.
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ton industry. The court may have felt, and justifiably so, that there
was an element of "hold up" in bringing suit under the conditions in
the Powell case, but neither the briefs nor the opinions indicate that
the "hold up" cases23 were consciously applied. Instead, the court
stresses the importance of protecting industry from any private encroachment. The Powell decision abrogates the balancing of equities
doctrine by denying relief to the private person just as the granting
of injunctions, the inequities of which gave rise to the balancing rule,
denied all relief to the industry. No jurisdictions can be found which
support a rule that goes as far toward giving industry unlimited rein as
does the principal case, and with the preponderance of judicial holdings favoring recovery, it is to be expected that the Powell ruling will
not long remain intact.
As for the dangers of undue harassment, there seems to be no real
basis for anticipating trouble in that direction. Though damages were
allowed in the Hardin case, the Bartel case and the Mattson case, there
does not seem to have been sufficient litigation to cause an undue burden to the industries concerned. Inasmuch as most of the population
of Concrete is dependent upon the cement plant, it is not likely that
many suits would be brought even if recovery had been allowed in
the instant case. It is true of any industrial community that those
most dependent upon the industry, who are thus not likely to bring
suit against it, are also the ones living nearest to the plant creating
the nuisance. Thus, the chances are remote that industry will be throttled by litigation.
If the supreme court is to uphold its latest decision regarding damages for nuisance, it will be sanctioning a holding which does violence
not only to the former case law of the state but also to the statutory
provision in point. In view of the overwhelming authority to the contrary found in Washington cases and those from other jurisdictions it
is likely that the Powell holding will be re-examined.
LUCILE LOMEN.

23 However, even where one does purchase property in the neighborhood of a nuisance, the court will grant damages. Hurlbut v. McKone, 55
Conn. 31, 44, 10 Atl. 164, 3 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1887); Susquehanna Fertilizer
Co. of Baltimore v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 20 Atl. 900, 9 L. R. A. 737 (1890);
COOLEY, supra note 15, § 446.

